Sunday, June 25, 2006

The Somme: its place in British history

The Somme: its place in British history

Andrew Robertshaw, head of education at the National Army Museum, explains why there is still so much interest in a battle that is passing out of living memory.

The modern fascination with the Battle of the Somme has its roots in the casualties of both the first day and following months.

These were unprecedented in British military history. The British lost more than 19,000 men in the first day of battle; more than 420,000 British and commonwealth soldiers were dead by the end of the campaign in November.

For our European allies these casualties were almost to be expected.

More than 100 years earlier the French and Russians lost 77,000 men in the Napoleonic Wars at the Battle of Borodino in 1812. And the French army had lost nearly one million men between the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 and Christmas 1915.

In 1914 Britain fielded an army smaller than Belgium, but in 1916 it had produced its first mass citizen army consisting of the pre-war Regulars, Reservists and Territorials who had been joined by the Volunteers of 1914 and 1915.

This new volunteer army was drawn from all social classes and parts of the country. 'Pals' battalions swelled the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to more than one million men.


The British population at the time was 46 million, therefore the number of men serving in the forces meant that few families did not have a relative serving at the front.
If war service touched nearly every family, then so did the casualties.

Families all over Britain and later the Dominions and Empire received the tragic news by letter or telegram, that a relative had been killed, was wounded or, typically for the conditions of the Battle of the Somme was missing.

The combination of bereaved families, the disabled who returned home and the veterans who rarely discussed their experiences have produced a legacy of family stories about the Somme. These have been passed down to a modern generation for whom the battle is history, but by family involvement, is also their history.

Many of those standing at the monument to the missing at Thiepval on 1 July his year as they meet to commemorate the fallen of the Somme, will be there to remember great uncles, great grandfathers and more distant relatives - men they never met, whom they know about from faded black and white photographs or a few letters or official documents.

However distant the relationship, it is these men who join the past with the present, who are the crucial link to a defining point in British and world history.


There is no question that in ten years' time public interest in the events of the Somme will have grown further still.
Critically, as the battle slips firmly out of living memory there may be a process of reassessment of the events of 1916. Some of the certainties of the "Lions led by donkeys" approach to Great War history which dominated public opinion from the early 1960s is being challenged by historians who are prepared to put the war and battle into context.

This revisionism is bound to be controversial, but the simple assumptions of armchair experts with the benefit of hindsight must be scrutinised if we are to be able to distinguish between mythology and historical reality.

History is about interpretation, not simply "facts", and the process of investigation will continue for as long as interest in the Battle of the Somme is sustained.

I once asked my grandfather, himself a World War One veteran, whether he thought it was just too simple to assume the Great War amounted to nothing but a "futile" waste of life.

He replied: "The generals did their job, we did ours. We won."

The same man wept on 3 September 1939 when the Great War became the First World War and another generation went to fight a "war to end all wars". The Great War did not end war any more than did the Second World War.

That failure is not something to blame on the men and women who did "their bit" in either conflict.


"The Battle of the Somme 1916: The Evidence" exhibition opens on 29 June at the National Army Museum, London.

There will be live coverage of the Somme commemorative march on BBC News 24 and the One O'Clock and Six O'Clock News throughout the week.

Saturday, June 24, 2006

About the US government's decision under George W. Bush to make war on Iraq

Why read Clausewitz when Shock and Awe can make a clean sweep of things?

Andrew Bacevich

Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor [ Buy from the London Review Bookshop ] · Atlantic, 603 pp, £25.00
The events of 11 September 2001 killed thousands, left many thousands more bereft, and horrified countless millions who merely bore witness. But for a few, 9/11 suggested an opportunity. In the inner circles of the United States government men of ambition seized on that opportunity with alacrity. Far from fearing a ‘global war on terror’, they welcomed it, certain of their ability to bend war to their purposes. Although the ensuing conflict has not by any means run its course, we are now in a position to begin evaluating the results of their handiwork.

To that effort, this very fine book makes an important contribution. A decade ago, Michael Gordon, a reporter with the New York Times, and Bernard Trainor, a retired US Marine Corps lieutenant general, collaborated on The Generals’ War, still perhaps the best narrative history of the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. Cobra II, a worthy successor, is packaged as an account of the planning and conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It should be read as a study of the politics of war. Although Gordon and Trainor describe in stirring detail the celebrated ‘march on Baghdad’, their real contribution has been to identify the confluence of factors that inspired the march, shaped it, and produced consequences very different from those expected.

One point above all stands out: the rationale for the war had next to nothing to do with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Weapons of mass destruction offered little more than a convenient pretext for a war conjured up to serve a multiplicity of ends. Neither the Baath Party regime nor the Iraqi army, crippled by defeat and well over a decade of sanctions, threatened anyone other than the Iraqi people. The hawks in the Bush administration understood this quite well. They hankered to invade Iraq not because Saddam was strong and dangerous but because he was weak and vulnerable, not because he was implicated in 9/11 but because he looked like an easy mark.

For the war’s architects, ‘Iraq was not a danger to avoid but a strategic opportunity,’ less a destination than a point of departure. In their eyes, 2003 was not 1945, but 1939: not a climax but the opening gambit of a vast enterprise largely hidden from public view. Allusions to Saddam as a new Hitler notwithstanding, they did not see Baghdad as Berlin but as Warsaw – a preliminary objective. For the war’s most determined proponents – Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz – toppling Saddam was the first phase of what was expected to be a long campaign. In Iraq they intended to set precedents, thereby facilitating other actions to follow. Although Bush portrayed himself as a reluctant warrior for whom armed conflict was a last resort, key members of his administration were determined that nothing should get in the way of a showdown with Saddam. ‘In crafting a strategy for Iraq,’ the undersecretary of defense Douglas Feith insisted to one baffled US general, ‘we cannot accept surrender.’ The object of the exercise was to demolish constraints on the subsequent employment of American power. Merely promulgating a doctrine of preventive war would not be enough: it was imperative actually to implement that doctrine.

The principal players in this game had their eyes fixed on two very different fronts. First, the Persian Gulf. As the Bush administration hawks saw it, the weak and feckless Clinton administration had allowed the once dominant US position in the region to slip in the course of the previous decade. Taking down Saddam promised to restore US pre-eminence, yielding large economic and political benefits. In the short term, a demonstration of American assertiveness would ease concerns about access to the energy reserves on which the prosperity of the developed world depended. A ‘friendly’ Iraq would reduce the need to cater to Saudi Arabia, whose friendship was looking increasingly problematic given that 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers had been Saudis. In the longer term, Iraq could serve as a secure operating base or jumping-off point for subsequent US efforts to extend the Pax Americana across the broader Middle East, a project expected to last decades. American power would eliminate the conditions that bred and sustained violent Islamic radicalism. That was the ultimate strategic rationale for war.

By planting the Stars and Stripes in downtown Baghdad, Gordon and Trainor write, the advocates of war intended not only to ‘implant democracy in a nation that had never known it’ but to ‘begin to redraw the political map of the region’. As ‘a demonstration of American power for Syria and other wayward regimes’, Operation Iraqi Freedom would show the consequences of defying the world’s only superpower. Even beyond the Middle East, Saddam’s demise was likely to have salutary effects, letting ‘other adversaries know they should watch their step’.

None of this could be done, however, until certain domestic obstacles had been removed. This was the second front, in many respects more challenging than the first. As Bush’s more bellicose lieutenants saw it, the principal constraints on the use of American power lay within the US government itself. In a speech to Defense Department employees only a day before 9/11, Rumsfeld had warned of ‘an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America’. Who was this adversary? Some evil tyrant or murderous terrorist? No, Rumsfeld announced: ‘The adversary’s closer to home. It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy.’ But the internal threat was not confined to this single bureaucracy. It included Congress and the Supreme Court, each of which could circumscribe presidential freedom of action. It extended to the CIA and the State Department, which the hawks viewed as obstructive and hidebound. It even took in the senior leadership of the US military, especially the unimaginative and excessively risk-averse Joint Chiefs of Staff. All these were capable of impeding the greater assertiveness that Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had yearned for well before the events of 9/11. Everyone had to be neutralised. In other words, unleashing American might abroad implied a radical reconfiguration of power relationships at home. On this score, 9/11 came as a godsend. The hawks, citing the urgent imperatives of national security, set out to concentrate authority in their own hands. September 11 inaugurated what became in essence a rolling coup.

Nominally, the object of the exercise was to empower the commander-in-chief to wage his global war on terror. Yet with George W. Bush a president in the mould of William McKinley or Warren Harding – an affable man of modest talent whose rise in national politics could be attributed primarily to his perceived electability – Cheney and his collaborators were engaged in an effort to enhance their own clout. Bush might serve as the front man; but on matters of substance, theirs would be the decisive voices. Gordon and Trainor describe the operative model this way: ‘The president would preside, the vice-president would guide, and the defense secretary would implement’ – with Wolfowitz and a handful of others lending the enterprise some semblance of intellectual coherence.

Step one – bringing Congress to heel – proved remarkably easy. Immediately after 9/11, the Senate and House of Representatives issued the executive branch the equivalent of a blank cheque. A joint resolution passed on 14 September not only authorised the president ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organisations or persons’ that had perpetrated 9/11, but also called on him ‘to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States’. The notorious Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 was a straitjacket compared to this spacious grant of authority. Even when the subsequent war on terror produced massive intelligence failures, operational ineptitude, the abuse of detainees and warrantless wiretaps, the White House had little difficulty keeping the legislative branch at bay. As long as Congress stays firmly in Republican hands, executive accountability will remain a theoretical proposition.

As if to drive home its ascendancy, the White House now claimed the prerogative of disregarding any congressional action that it did not like. On at least 750 occasions during his first five years in office, Bush issued so-called signing statements voiding legislative provisions with which he disagreed. When Congress last year roused itself long enough to ban torture as an instrument of US policy, Bush asserted that as commander-in-chief he would abide by this stricture only so far as it suited him to do so. As a result of all this, the aftermath of 9/11 saw the system of checks and balances all but collapse. Individual legislators still quibble and gripe, but as an institution, Congress at present hardly amounts to more than a nuisance. Its chief function is simply to appropriate the ever more spectacular sums of money that the war on terror requires and to rubber stamp increases in the national debt. This, of course, it routinely and obligingly does.

Nor, thus far at least, have the courts interfered with this presidential muscle-flexing. The Supreme Court historically has shown little inclination to encroach on presidential turf in time of war. Any prospect of the court confronting this president was seemingly nipped in the bud by the fortuitous retirement of one justice followed by the death of another. In appointing John Roberts and Samuel Alito, Bush elevated to the court two jurists with track records of giving the executive branch a wide berth on matters relating to national security. (Once on the court, justices don’t always perform as expected; whether the Roberts court will actually defer to the chief executive on national security issues remains to be seen.)

Within the executive branch itself, however, efforts by Cheney and Rumsfeld to consolidate authority in their own hands have encountered fierce resistance. Here Cobra II confirms much of what we already know. During the months leading up to the Iraq war, Rumsfeld and his aides waged a bureaucratic battle royal to marginalise the State Department and to wrest control of intelligence analysis away from the CIA. Colin Powell was one casualty of that bruising fight. George Tenet, eased out as CIA director, was another. Whether that battle has ended is another matter. With Rumsfeld himself lately under siege and Condoleezza Rice enjoying Bush’s confidence as Powell never did, and with efforts to silence the CIA having yielded a criminal indictment of the vice-president’s former chief of staff, a declaration of victory on behalf of the Cheney-Rumsfeld axis might be premature. The overall conclusion, however, is as clear as it is disturbing. To the extent that any meaningful limits on executive power survive, they are almost entirely bureaucratic. This administration has eviscerated the constitution.

Within the Department of Defense, the hawks were intent on calling the shots. Determined to have a decisive voice in deciding when and where the United States would fight, they also wanted to dictate how it would fight. The team Rumsfeld recruited to assist him in managing the Pentagon contained an unusual number of military zealots, men who believed in the utility of force and viewed the prospect of war with considerable enthusiasm.

In addition to Wolfowitz and Feith, the group included Stephen Cambone, Lawrence Di Rita, William Luti and, on a part-time basis, Richard Perle, who chaired the Defense Policy Board. Several of them had had a hand in rebuilding the armed forces, kicking the Vietnam syndrome, and winning the Cold War in the 1980s in the service of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. They had, in their own minds, raised American influence and prestige to heights not seen since the end of World War Two. Yet they had left office in 1993 with the nagging sense that their mission was unfinished. Although the hegemony of the world’s sole superpower was real enough, it wasn’t absolute and unquestioned.

Then came the era of Bill Clinton: eight years of drift and stagnation camouflaged by the vaporous talk in which the ‘Man from Hope’ specialised. With his notion of foreign policy as a variant of social work, Clinton had repeatedly misused America’s armed forces. Kowtowing to his own generals, he had failed to push through the reforms essential for perpetuating US military dominance. Beguiled by his own rhetoric about globalisation, he had ignored threats brewing in East Asia and the Middle East. In the Clinton years, American power had atrophied even as new dangers proliferated. For the zealots, these were wilderness years. Apart from publishing an occasional op-ed or signing the odd manifesto, they were stuck on the sidelines, watching with dismay. The Bush restoration of November-December 2000 offered the chance to reverse this slide towards decline and disarray. Although they had made little headway in promoting their agenda during the administration’s first months, the propitious onset of the global war on terror promised to change all that. For those intent on establishing beyond doubt and beyond challenge the supremacy of American arms, an expansive, amorphous, open-ended war seemed made to order.

When it came to cementing US military dominion, however, Rumsfeld and his closest associates viewed the Pentagon brass less as part of the solution than as part of the problem. Concerned that the JCS and its staff had emerged ‘as a rival source of power’ during the Clinton years, Rumsfeld intended to put the generals in their place. But this was easier said than done. Before 9/11, the generals pushed back: inside ‘the Building’, Rumsfeld’s ideas and his imperious manner touched off a round of nasty civil-military conflict. Questions of personality aside, disagreement centred on what national security aficionados call ‘transformation’, Rumsfeld’s vision of a redesigned armed force: lighter, more agile and more usable than before. As he and his disciples saw it, senior military officers (army officers especially) were still enamoured of the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force – lots of tanks, lots of artillery, and lots of ‘boots on the ground’. Rumsfeld’s vision of a new American way of war instead placed the emphasis on quality – precise intelligence, precise weapons, and smaller numbers of troops, primarily elite special operations forces.

Implicit in the Powell Doctrine was the assumption that the wars of the future would be large, uncertain, expensive and therefore infrequent. Implicit in Rumsfeld’s thinking was the expectation that future American wars would be brief and economical, all but eliminating the political risk of opting for force. Rumsfeld believed that technology was rendering obsolete old worries about fog, friction and chance. Why bother studying Clausewitz when Shock and Awe could make a clean sweep of things? For Rumsfeld and his coterie, this was the appeal of having a go at Iraq: a swift victory over Saddam would validate Rumsfeld’s ‘vision’ and discredit those who were obstructing his reforms. According to Cobra II, he was certain that a ‘rapid defeat of Iraq on his terms would break the spine of army resistance to his transformation goal once and for all.’

Gordon and Trainor describe in detail the process that eventually produced a campaign plan which met with Rumsfeld’s approval. The Joint Chiefs of Staff essentially played no role in this. Rumsfeld had little use for their advice. The compliant JCS chairman, General Richard Myers, so much under Rumsfeld’s thumb that he was ‘incapable of expressing an independent view’, remained an onlooker. When Eric Shinseki, the army chief of staff, dared to suggest that occupying Iraq might require several hundred thousand troops, Wolfowitz retaliated with a public rebuke and Rumsfeld instantly pushed the general into oblivion.

Rumsfeld’s chosen military interlocutor was General Tommy Franks, the commander of United States Central Command. In a bestselling memoir published after his retirement, Franks portrays himself as a ‘good old boy’ from west Texas who also happens to be a military genius. In Cobra II, he comes across as Rumsfeld’s useful idiot: a coarse, not especially bright, kiss-up, kick-down martinet who mistreats his subordinates but keeps his boss happy. Franks knew that he wasn’t in charge, but he pretended otherwise. Appreciating the ‘political value in being able to stand at the Pentagon podium and say that the Bush administration was implementing the military’s plan’, Rumsfeld was happy to play along.

The invasion plan that Rumsfeld bludgeoned Franks into drafting foresaw a relatively small force rushing towards Baghdad at breakneck speed, swiftly toppling the Baath regime, and just as quickly extricating itself. ‘The Iraq War would be like a thunderstorm: a short, violent episode that swept away the enemy but would not entail a burdensome, long-term troop commitment.’ Underlying these expectations were three key assumptions: that the regular Iraqi army wouldn’t fight; that the Iraqi people would greet US and British troops as liberators; and that major Iraqi institutions would survive the war intact, facilitating the rapid withdrawal of all but a small contingent of occupying forces.

In the event, these assumptions proved fallacious, even with Saddam Hussein doing his best to help out: convinced that the US would never actually try to take Baghdad, Saddam concentrated on threats from Iran and from within Iraq itself; as a consequence, the Iraqi general staff had no plan worthy of the name to defend against an Anglo-American attack. When that attack began, the anticipated mass defection of Iraqi forces did not occur. The Iraqi army did fight, though poorly – and some US troops found even this level of opposition disconcerting. ‘Why would the Iraqis shoot at us?’ one army captain wondered to himself. ‘We are the good guys.’ Iraqi irregulars – the Fedayeen – offered a spirited resistance that caught allied commanders by surprise. Meanwhile, the welcome given to allied forces as they traversed southern Iraq proved to be spotty and less than wholehearted. Worse still, when Baghdad fell, Iraq’s political infrastructure collapsed, and mass disorder followed.

These developments (especially the appearance of irregular forces), dismissed by the Pentagon and Central Command as mere blemishes on an otherwise perfect campaign, were a portent of things to come. Neither Franks nor Rumsfeld responded to these warnings. Gordon and Trainor rightly indict Franks for failing the most fundamental responsibility of high command: the general did not ‘comprehend the nature of the war he was directing’. But the charge applies equally to Rumsfeld and his team of zealots. An obdurately conventional soldier, Franks lacked the wit to grasp that the conflict in which he was engaged was anything but conventional. Entranced with his vision of warfare rendered precise by precision weapons, Rumsfeld had little patience with facts that did not fit with his preconceptions.

Although US forces made it to Baghdad, and Bush soon thereafter declared an end to ‘major combat operations’, it was all downhill from there. An incident in Fallujah – troops from the 82nd Airborne Division fired into a crowd of angry demonstrators – kick-started the insurgency. That was on 24 April 2003. Heavy-handed US tactics added fuel to the fire. ‘The only thing these sand niggers understand is force and I’m about to introduce them to it,’ a senior officer in the 4th Infantry Division is quoted as saying. Bush’s chosen proconsul, Paul Bremer, compounded the problem by dissolving the remnants of the Iraqi army, thereby providing the insurgents with a pool of potential recruits. As Franks made his escape, command in Iraq devolved on Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, an officer of indifferent ability, poorly prepared for the challenges he faced, and unable to forge an amicable relationship with Bremer.

Cobra II provides only the briefest sketch of all the ugly events that followed. The volume concludes with a summary of the administration’s myriad errors: underestimating the enemy, failing to understand the fractious nature of Iraqi society, relying excessively on technology, and failing to anticipate the magnitude of the nation-building task that could not be avoided. But one failure stands out. Rumsfeld’s grand plan to transform the US military was at odds with the administration’s grand plans to transform the broader Middle East. Imperial projects don’t prosper with small armies that leave quickly: they require large armies that stay. Out of this arrogance, incompetence and sheer stupidity came a policy failure that may yet beggar the debacle of Vietnam.

Andrew Bacevich teaches history and international relations at Boston University. He is the author of The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War.

About Walmart

**This is a deeply insightful, objective and relevant article, encompassing both local and global politics**

The Price of Pickles
From the London Review of Books
John Lanchester

The Wal-Mart Effect: How an Out-of-Town Superstore Became a Superpower by Charles Fishman [ Buy from the London Review Bookshop ] · Allen Lane, 294 pp, £12.99
Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price directed by Robert Greenwald
The moment of revelation is a little different for every person who experiences it. For Sam Walton, founder of Wal-Mart, the road to Damascus came in the form of a pair of knickers. At the time – 1945 – Walton was in his late twenties, and was running a small department store in Newport, Arkansas belonging to a franchise called Ben Franklin. Walton had grown up in Missouri and attended the state university, then gone on to a clerical job during the war. He married Helen Robson, borrowed some money from her lawyer-banker father, then opened his Ben Franklin ‘variety store’.

The life-changing pair of panties appeared in a list of goods sold by a garment-industry middleman in New York. The pants were ‘two-barred, tricot satin panties with an elastic waist’ and their price, $2 a dozen, was 50 cents cheaper than that offered by Walton’s current supplier. This differential allowed Walton to sell the knickers at four for $1 instead of three for $1. The panties began to get up off the shelves and walk out of the shop on their own. The clouds parted, a beam of light shone down, and, as Walton reports in his autobiography, Made in America:

Here’s the simple lesson we learned . . . which eventually changed the way retailers sell and customers buy all across America: say I bought an item for 80 cents. I found that by pricing it at $1 I could sell three times more of it than by pricing it at $1.20. I might make only half the profit per item, but because I was selling three times as many, the overall profit was much greater. Simple enough. But this is really the essence of discounting: by cutting your price, you can boost your sales to a point where you earn far more at the cheaper retail price than you would have by selling the item at the higher price. In retailer language, you can lower your mark-up but earn more because of the increased volume.

Arthur Danto once observed that Andy Warhol had only one idea – roughly, that mass-produced media images could be seen as a form of art – but that what was unique about him was that he fully grasped that idea in every aspect, artistically, philosophically, commercially, psychologically. Sam Walton was a little like that about price. Many people in many different businesses have had their equivalent cheap-knicker epiphany. But Walton was the only person to do two things. First, he made price the central question at every stage of his business, from top to bottom, from the utmost frugality of his own offices and living habits, to paying everybody involved at every stage of the business as little as possible, to exerting the maximum pressure on his suppliers, not just to not-raise their prices, but to lower them, every year. This is easy to conceive: it would be not much of an exaggeration to say that every business in the world fantasises about keeping costs rigorously down. But it is very, very hard to do, and to keep doing, when things like an extra lick of paint, or a slightly increased wage bill, or the wiggle room offered by giving customers a hint of style – which allows retailers to charge more – are all so tempting. Second, Walton combined his fanatical insistence on low prices with a manic appetite for expansion and innovation: he would open everywhere, he would try anything to sell stuff, and he would do so without ever relaxing his grip on the numbers and the costs and the always paramount question of price, price, price. Most company mottoes and advertising slogans are bullshit. Wal-Mart means what it says: ‘Always low prices’ – a slogan which on some of its stores now simply appears as ‘Always’, in the knowledge that its customers can be trusted to complete the thought.

The first Wal-Mart opened in Rogers, Arkansas, in 1962, its founder having spent the intervening years learning the retail industry from top to toe, then branching out into ‘discount’ – i.e. ultra-cheap – retailing, then finally setting up shop on his own. Not everyone in the business swooned in admiration when they first encountered Wal-Mart. David Glass, who years later succeeded Walton as chairman of the company, travelled down to Harrison, Arkansas, to see the opening of one of the new shops:

It was the worst retail store I had ever seen. Sam had brought a couple of trucks of watermelons in and stacked them on the sidewalk. He had a donkey ride out in the parking lot. It was about 115 degrees, and the watermelons began to pop, and the donkey began to do what donkeys do, and it all mixed together and ran all over the parking lot. And when you went inside the store, the mess just continued, having been tracked in all over the floor. He was a nice fellow, but I wrote him off. It was just terrible.

That was 1964. The air of chaos was to some extent real. Accounts were done on the ESP method: ‘If you can’t make your books balance, you take however much they’re off by and enter it under the heading ESP, which stands for Error Some Place.’ But the prices were real, too, and so were the customers, and so was the rate at which the company was expanding, and so was the control Walton kept on his costs and his suppliers, and before long he could let the figures do the talking. By 1970, Wal-Mart had 32 stores doing $31 million in sales. Growth went like this: 1972, 51 stores and $78 million; 1974, 78 and $168m; 1976, 125 and $340m. By 1980 Wal-Mart had 276 stores and $1.2 billion in sales and the Walton family, who had kept hold of significant portions of the stock after the company went public in 1970, were fuck-off rich. Anyone who thought this might in any way slow Sam Walton down did not understand him or the company he had built. Wal-Mart continued its expansion after his death in 1992; its current chairman, Lee Scott, has headed the firm since 2000. At the time of writing the Walton family share of Wal-Mart is worth $102 billion. (The 2004 Bush tax cut benefited the family to the tune of $91,500 per hour.) Wal-Mart is the biggest company in the world. It has two million employees; has projected sales of $315 billion for this year; is the biggest retailer in the US, Mexico, Canada, and is not much smaller in many other of its markets (including the UK, where, trading as Asda, it is the second biggest supermarket chain); it is the largest employer in two-thirds of the 50 United States. Indeed, almost every statistic about the company involves the word ‘biggest’, including the one about its being the subject of the biggest private lawsuit in history, concerning the underpayment and underpromotion of 1.5 million female employees.

Wal-Marts these days, by and large, are not awash with watermelon juice and donkey urine. That’s not to say they are pleasant places in which to shop. They are huge sheds, harshly lit, and the stuff on sale gives the impression of being crammed and stacked and heaped, all to emphasise the overwhelming message of low, low price. To the UK reader, this will seem an unfamiliar form of supermarket shopping, since our own retail sector is dominated by companies who put lots of effort into small but signifier-rich distinctions based on class. This is reflected in every aspect of their branding, packaging, advertising and self-image: Marks & Spencer’s is very middle-class, Sainsbury’s is middle-class, Tesco is careful to track the aspirations of the British mass market, and Asda is more like its former, cheap-but-cheerful self than it is like an entirely made-over version of its Wal-Mart parent. Wal-Mart is about price, so much so that it has created a reification of cheapness, in which cheapness becomes a mystical quality, a Ding an sich or fundamental essence, separate from questions about utility or practicality or how on earth a thing can be put on sale for such a price. Charles Fishman, in his punchy and valuable book The Wal-Mart Effect, cites the example of Vlasic pickles, the most popular brand in the US. Wal-Mart talked Vlasic into pricing the pickles so that a gallon jar was on sale for $2.97. That is a bizarre, surreal price for a gallon of pickled cucumbers; no one had ever seen such a jar outside a deli, and no one had any real use for it, since even if you’re a pickleholic you’ll only manage to eat about a quarter of a gallon before the remaining pickles go mouldy. It had never occurred to anybody that there was such a thing as a market for a gallon jar of pickles. Even so, priced at $2.97, there was something so magnetising about this Brobdignagian vat of pickles – something so alluring about the way it embodied the Platonic ideal of cheapness, in and for itself – that Wal-Mart was soon selling 200,000 gallons of pickles a week. The ‘scary part of the Vlasic story’, as Fishman points out, is that:

The market didn’t create the $2.97 gallon of pickles, nor did waning customer demand or a wild abundance of cucumbers. Wal-Mart created the $2.97 gallon jar of pickles. The price – a number that is a critical piece of information to buyers, sellers and competitors about the state of the pickle market – the price was a lie. It was unrelated to either the supply of cucumbers or the demand for pickles. The price was a fiction imposed on the pickle market in Bentonville. Consumers saw a bargain; Vlasic saw no way out. Both were responding not to real market forces, but to a pickle price gimmick imposed by Wal-Mart as a way of making a statement.

Wal-Mart is so big and so powerful that it is in effect defining its own reality – creating its own products, and a market for them, by sheer act of will. Fishman cites the example of Chilean salmon. This is on sale in Wal-Mart for $4.84 a pound. Atlantic salmon is – there’s a subtle hint in the name – not native to the Pacific, and 12 years ago there were no Atlantic salmon at all anywhere in Chile. Today, 65 per cent of the farmed salmon eaten in America is Chilean, and salmon farming has taken over the economy of southern Chile, ‘ushering in an industrial revolution that has turned thousands of Chileans from subsistence farmers and fishermen into hourly paid salmon processing-plant workers’. The salmon live in huge underwater pens, and leave a ‘toxic sludge’ of excrement and uneaten food on the ocean bed. The impact of that cheap fish – as Fishman points out, ‘you couldn’t mail a pound of salmon back to Chile for $4.84’ – on the environment and social structure of Chile is enormous. Inspired by this example I took a look around my local Asda and found fresh Brazilian sirloin at £2.96 for a 250g steak. Let’s parse that price. Beef cattle are usually between one and two years old. So that cow was raised and fed for (say) 18 months, slaughtered, butchered, packaged, refrigerated, shipped six thousand miles, distributed and shelved. It paid the wages of everybody involved in those processes, and made its profit for Wal-Mart, and still cost £2.44 less than it would cost to post the steak back to Brazil. The feeling this gives is a little like the one that washes over you when you see flights advertised for 99p: something just isn’t right.

Robert Greenwald’s documentary Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price makes a strong argument about what exactly is not right. It boils down to the question of just how Wal-Mart achieves its control of costs – a word which, in a business context, to a large extent means ‘wages’. The best documented controversy in this area concerns the abuses Wal-Mart has committed in the US, where the bulk of its ‘associates’ – i.e. employees; Sam Walton thought up the name after a visit to John Lewis – earn between $8 and $9 an hour. As the current head of Wal-Mart likes to point out, this is twice the minimum wage; but it is still a sum so low that a large number of Wal-Mart workers qualify for free medical aid and equivalent relief programmes in a large number of American states. In other words, you can be working for Wal-Mart and still live in poverty. (I suspect that this section of the documentary plays differently in Europe, since over here using state services is no badge of shame. Not quite, not just yet.) Other documented abuses include making ‘associates’ work overtime without pay, forcing them to work after they have clocked off, and locking them in stores overnight, allegedly to prevent stealing. All these abuses are, obviously, linked to the question of keeping down prices/costs/ wages. Lawsuits on these issues have taken place or are pending in 31 states.

Wal-Mart is, it almost goes without saying, fanatically anti-union. As one union organiser says in the film, it is ‘one of the most anti, if not the most aggressively anti-union company in the entire history of the United States’ – which is really saying something. The company goes to all the usual lengths to try and keep unions out of its stores: one favourite tactic is, the instant union activity begins in a store, immediately announcing a freeze on all pay rises, saying, ‘we can’t give anyone in this store a pay rise because we can’t be seen to be giving in to bribery.’ Just as unadmirable, but slightly harder to understand, is the alleged institutional bias against women that has caused the company to be the subject of the huge class-action lawsuit mentioned above. It is characteristic of Wal-Mart that, having been made the subject of the lawsuit, the corporation is tackling it in the most aggressive way possible, by arguing that the class-action suit violates its legal rights. Specifically, Wal-Mart claims that the suit violates its right to argue every single case on its specific merits; it says it should have the right to contest every lawsuit separately on a store-by-store basis. This would, obviously, overturn the principle on which class-action lawsuits are built. This won’t succeed in the Ninth Circuit of the US federal court system, but Wal-Mart are very clearly heading for the Supreme Court, with its shiny new ultra-conservative bias. A ruling in favour of Wal-Mart would effectively make all corporations immune from class-action lawsuits. Watch this space.

Still, all these examples are from America – indeed, they mainly emerge from the light shone on the company by the American legal system. The most damaging damage done by Wal-Mart is in the developing world, and is harder to document. Not all of it is illegal. My local Asda sells some nice shirts at remarkably low prices: I could kit my sons out in England shirts for the World Cup, throw in a Fungus the Bogeyman DVD, and still have change from a tenner. But it’s hard to get out of one’s mind that Wal-Mart employs 189,000 seamstresses in Bangladesh, paid an hourly rate of between 13 and 17 cents. Robina Akther, a Bangladeshi factory worker cited by Fishman, was employed to sew pockets on the backs of women’s trousers. She earned 13 cents an hour for a 14-hour day, had a target of 120 pairs an hour, and had ten days off a year. ‘If you made any mistakes or fell behind on your goal, they beat you.’ China is probably as bad – I say probably because it isn’t possible to know for sure. We do know that imports from China to Wal-Mart in the US alone are worth $18 billion. ‘Do you know why you can buy such a cheap toy?’ a young Chinese woman factory worker asks in Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price. ‘That’s because we work all day, every day and night.’ Wal-Mart, a labour expert comments in the same documentary, ‘is sucking standards down across the world’. I decided to pass on the shirts.

So: Wal-Mart – bad thing, tout court? It’s not quite as simple as that. Low prices are not so easily dismissed. People don’t shop at Wal-Mart because it’s fun, they do it to save money, and there is no disputing that they save a great deal of money; one can argue about many aspects of the company’s impact, but not about its effect on prices. Fishman says that a conservative estimate of the amount saved by shoppers in Wal-Mart USA in 2004 is $30 billion. The effect is so great that, according to one big economic study, it causes the US government’s official Consumer Price Index to be wrong by 15 per cent, all because the CPI doesn’t quite know how to calculate the effect Wal-Mart has on what consumers actually spend. The economists found that food and dry goods at Wal-Mart are on average 27 per cent cheaper than at traditional grocery stores. For the American poor, those savings are a real benefit. And we all benefit from the anti-inflationary effect of low prices.

Except that, again, it’s not quite as simple as that. There is a great deal written about Wal-Mart, most of it negative, but actual data on the effects of the company are hard to find. Wal-Mart has a deep distrust of the world at large and although it tracks and monitors its own figures to an extent surpassed by no one – tracking hourly sales of every item through every till in every one of its shops, all the time – it doesn’t share any of this information. An economist, Emek Basker from Missouri, who set out to measure the economic impact of Wal-Mart on communities where it had opened stores, took an entire year just to assemble a list of the shops and when they had opened. She had to use fancy mathematical calculations of probability to work out the dates. ‘It was very tedious,’ she says. No kidding. (The fact that it took an MIT-trained economist a year to crunch data and come up with information which Wal-Mart could have provided in ten seconds, had it chosen to do so, is in itself alarming.) The overall price decline Basker came up with was between 7 and 13 per cent. That’s a lot of money saved by a lot of (mainly) poor people.

When it comes to the question of employment, it has proved harder to come up with an unambiguous answer about the impact of Wal-Mart, since the company both creates jobs (in its stores) and destroys them (in the area around the stores). A paper by an Iowa economist, Ken Stone, showed that, in the decade from 1983, small Iowa towns lost 47 per cent of their total retail sales. To take one specific example, 43 per cent of men’s and boys’ clothing shops went out of business. That is a lot of quantified misery in a lot of small towns; a great deal of cost to set against the benefit of lower prices. An economist at Penn State called Stephan Goetz came up with one of the most suggestive results of all. In the course of studying poverty rates, he grew interested in the many local arguments about whether Wal-Mart had a net harmful effect on communities, or whether its damaging effects were offset by the beneficial impact of lower prices. So he crunched data for the period from 1989 to 1999, during which family poverty rates in the US declined from 13.1 per cent to 10.7 per cent, and found something surprising: in counties which had a Wal-Mart, the poverty rate fell only to 11 per cent. Spread across the US, that adds up to twenty thousand families kept in poverty because of Wal-Mart. He did a great deal of work to rule out other potential causes of this startling result, before concluding: ‘The presence of Wal-Mart unequivocally raised family poverty rates in US counties during the 1990s.’ Fishman says that the study hasn’t attracted much attention in the US media; perhaps because it is news that no one wants to hear.

When I began reading up on Wal-Mart, I started with the assumption that the company was in a sense a synecdoche for globalised capitalism in general. It sometimes happens that a company, usually because of a single high-profile abuse, or through a publicity campaign on the part of a pressure group, becomes the target for protesters against a whole category of perceived injustice. Plenty of companies were investors in apartheid South Africa, but Barclays became the focus of protests and boycotts; there are plenty of companies which could have become symbols of globalisation, but Starbucks happened to become a symbol for No-Logoism; most oil companies have done terrible things in collusion with terrible regimes all around the world, but Shell got special flak over its dealings in Nigeria; and Nike became a poster-boy target for protesters against the sweatshops that make a large and growing portion of the Western world’s consumer goods. The targets of these protests deserved everything they got. But the risk of this kind of protest is that it can forget that it is symbolic, and that the real wrongs in the global order of things are structural and systematic.

Wal-Mart is a complicated case, because on the one hand it is so big that it doesn’t just symbolise certain things, but enacts them on a globally significant scale. Barclays could divest from South Africa, and so what? But when Wal-Mart decides something, it has real effects. In the early 1990s (this example is from Fishman) Wal-Mart decided to do away with cardboard cartons for containers of anti-perspirant, and behold, they are no more – with the result that a billion cardboard packets no longer go into landfill every year. As Hegel used to say after his fourth stein of lager, quantity changes quality. If Wal-Mart instituted, say, a zero-tolerance policy against developing-world factories abusing their workforces, and simultaneously brought in a regime of unannounced factory inspections combined with anonymous, off-site interviews with workers, it would probably do more to change the working conditions in Third World sweatshops than any government on the planet.

That, though, is the problem. Wal-Mart stretches far beyond the reach of any government. Opposition to it, and interrogation of it, is a local phenomenon. In the US, it is conducted in part through the legal system: a $50 million settlement in Colorado for off-the-clock working, an $11 million federal settlement for using illegal immigrants, an $80 million fine in Texas for not disclosing evidence about safety problems, und so weiter. This adds up to a partial and piecemeal critique of the company conducted by the courts, but it does not amount to a way of thinking about Wal-Mart. Opposition to the stores is an increasing phenomenon, and now no Wal-Mart opens without a campaign against it; as I write, the splendidly named city of Hercules, California has resorted to the last-ditch tactic of ‘eminent domain’, i.e. compulsory purchase of the land, to fight off a proposed Wal-Mart store. An equivalent campaign against a giant Asda in Upton Park features in Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price. Good on them. But the trouble with these arguments is that they all proceed too directly from self-interest. They allow Wal-Mart to cite various pieces of evidence in its favour, the principal one being that people use its shops in such huge numbers. The next line of defence against the company is therefore ethical; it throws the burden of making the moral choice back on the individual consumer. Google ‘should I shop at Wal-Mart?’ and you will find a cool 12 million hits; this is a question that has many people profoundly exercised. The trouble is that choosing not to shop at Wal-Mart for ethical reasons is both a political action and a retreat from politics. Ethical consumption may indeed be the best we can do, and it gives the ethical consumer a nice warm glow, but it is also another form of self-expression through consumption, and it is consumption, at root, which is the problem. At a global level, you could say that choosing not to shop at Wal-Mart is just another form of shopping at Wal-Mart.

But Wal-Mart is a symbol as well as a reality, and it is as a symbol that the company has the potential to be even more consequential for the world than it already is. Sam Walton’s unceasing insistence on price; the company’s relentless expansion; the impact of a globally ‘flat’ world when it comes to the attempts of Western companies to outsource labour and manufacturing; the collapse of Communism and the now more or less unchallenged status of capitalism as the global ideology; the fact that Wal-Mart is the biggest company in the world: all these make it a unique exemplar of the Way We Live Now. In a sense, Wal-Mart is global capitalism – and it is this which gives some of the complaints against it, in Fishman’s book and Greenwald’s film and on the web, a certain plaintive edge. Most of the objectors – particularly in America – are not objecting to the system, they are objecting to the way the system impacts on them, in the form of Wal-Mart. But if companies are free to compete on price, and free to outsource their costs in a world which, for the first time, has an effectively infinite pool of easily accessible cheap labour, then the only thing to be said to people objecting to Wal-Mart is: go off and found a new planet, because on this one, that’s how it works.

The case of Wal-Mart makes us realise just how badly we lack a way of talking about the public good that is not framed purely in terms of economics. The huge fortunes made at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th centuries were broken up by anti-monopoly and anti-cartel legislation, because they had been accumulated at the expense of the public good. That is a useful idea, and one that needs to be revived and used as a yardstick. In its absence, the only ways of talking about Wal-Mart we have are through economics, which offers clear figures (sometimes) whose meanings are murky; or through local protests and objections; or through considering our own ethics as consumers. That, I would say, is not enough. The collapse of Communism had overwhelmingly positive effects on its former subjects, but in the West we are missing the need to compare ourselves ethically against an ideological antagonist. The welfare state, free universal healthcare, paid holidays, workers’ benefits of all kinds – how many of these would we have if it were not for the need to show that the West could not just outcompete Communism, but was ethically superior to it? How much have our rights in these areas grown since Communism collapsed? We’re a lot richer, of course. Is that all we now have to say for ourselves? Put it like this: would Guantánamo have happened during the Cold War? Would any Western government have permitted itself a crime of such flagrancy? We no longer have to compare ourselves with a global antagonist. The only thing we have to look at is the mirror. When we look there, part of what we see is Wal-Mart.

John Lanchester is the author of three novels: The Debt to Pleasure, Mr Phillips and Fragrant Harbour.

Miami “terror” arrests—a government provocation

Miami “terror” arrests—a government provocation
Published on Asian Tribune (http://www.asiantribune.com)

Created 2006-06-25 01:49
By Bill Van Auken – World Socialist Web Site

There are many incongruities surrounding the arrest of seven men from the impoverished Liberty City neighborhood of Miami on charges of conspiracy to “wage war on the United States” that suggest it, like so many previous “terrorist plots” announced by the Bush administration, is a government-inspired provocation mounted for reactionary political ends.

None of the claims made by the government and repeated uncritically by the media concerning the arrest of these young working-class men can be accepted as good coin. Both the flimsiness of the criminal indictment and the lurid headlines surrounding it mark this event as an escalation in the anti-democratic conspiracies of the Bush administration.

There is every indication that this latest purported terrorist threat—described by some media outlets as “even bigger than September 11”—was manufactured by the FBI, which used an undercover agent posing as a terrorist mastermind to entrap those targeted for arrest.

While the Justice Department declared that the arrests had foiled a plot to blow up the tallest building in the US, the Sears Tower in Chicago, authorities in that city assured its residents that there had never been any threat to the structure.

The four-count indictment presented by the Justice Department in a Miami federal court on Friday contains not a single indication of an overt criminal act or even the means to carry one out. The brief 11-page document consists almost entirely of alleged statements made by the defendants to the FBI informant, referred to in quotes throughout the indictment as “the al Qaeda representative.”

The government chose to consummate its entrapment plan by unleashing dozens of combat-equipped federal agents, dressed in olive drab fatigues and carrying automatic weapons, on the predominantly African-American Liberty City neighborhood, one of the poorest in the country. Liberty City was the scene of riots that broke out in 1980 after the acquittal of white police officers for the beating death of a black motorist.

On Thursday, the government’s paramilitary squads confronted residents with pictures of the accused, demanding to know their whereabouts. The seven defendants are representative of the impoverished working class population of Miami, including Haitian immigrants.

It appears they were targeted by the FBI because they had formed a religious group, calling themselves the “Seas of David,” which reportedly incorporated elements of Christianity and Islam. One of their crimes, according to the FBI’s deputy director, John Pistole, was that the Seas of David “did not believe the United States government had legal authority over them.”

According to some residents of the neighborhood, the group lived together in the warehouse that was raided by the FBI, using it for religious worship and as a base of operations for a construction business.

Elements of the federal indictment are so self-incriminating as to border on the ludicrous. Among the charges are that the defendants “swore an oath of loyalty to al Qaeda.” Who administered this oath? The “al Qaeda representative,” AKA, the paid informant of the FBI.

Aside from this “loyalty oath” solicited by the FBI, only one of the seven defendants is accused of any overt act, outside of driving the FBI informant to meetings.

The only action with which this one individual is charged—all else is words—is taking pictures of the FBI headquarters in Miami. Who supplied the camera? The “al Qaeda representative”—i.e., the FBI agent provocateur.

The indictment further charges two of the accused with driving “with the ‘al Qaeda representative’” to a store in Dade County, Florida to purchase a memory chip for a digital camera to be used for taking reconnaissance photographs of the FBI building. The document does not say who paid for the chip, but there is hardly room for doubt.

In one of the more curious sections of the indictment, one of the accused, Narseal Batiste, is accused of asking the FBI informant to provide various items for his group, including footwear, for which he provided a “list of shoe sizes.” Apparently the FBI delivered the shoes.

Pistole, the FBI deputy director, admitted that the supposed plots to blow up buildings had been “more aspirational than operational.” In the raids carried out by the FBI squads, no weapons and no explosive substances were found.

“We preempted their plot,” declared Pistole. But the indictment and the facts of the case indicate that the alleged plot would never have existed had the government not planned and instigated it in the first place.

At a Washington press conference, US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales acknowledged that the alleged plot had posed no actual danger. He claimed this was because the authorities had intervened “in its earliest stages.
”
So “early” was the preemption that officials associated with the supposed targets of the plot dismissed the government’s indictment. Barbara Carley, the managing director of the Sears Tower, told the press, “Federal and local authorities continue to tell us they’ve never found evidence of a credible terrorism threat against Sears Tower that’s ever gone beyond just talk.”

Her remarks were echoed by Chicago Police Superintendent Phil Cline, who said, “There never was any credible threat to the Sears Tower at all.”

In his press conference, Attorney General Gonzales asserted that the Miami group represented a “new brand of terrorism” created by “the convergence of globalization and technology.”

What these words mean is anyone’s guess. There is no indication that those charged, who were living in a warehouse in the poorest city in America, had access to any technology, and their supposed contact to the wider world was an informer planted by the FBI. The suggestion that the seven men were a “home-grown” terrorist group inspired by contact with Al Qaeda elements over the Internet is supported neither by evidence nor the charges contained in the government’s own indictment.

R. Alexander Acosta, the United States attorney in South Florida, told the media that the defendants had “lived in the United States for most of their lives, but developed a hatred of America.” This is presented as though it constituted evidence of a crime.

It is hardly surprising for someone living in Liberty City to hate the poverty and oppression that prevail there, or for Haitian immigrants to despise the imprisonment and repression that Washington metes out to those attempting to escape the brutal conditions imposed by US imperialism upon their homeland.

What is highly noteworthy is that the federal government decided to intervene in this situation to concoct a phony Al Qaeda connection and trumped up “terror plot.”

What is the government’s motive in manufacturing such a plot? Whose interests are served? Under conditions in which the majority of the American people have turned against the Iraq war and support the withdrawal of American troops, the Bush administration is desperately attempting to once again link its neo-colonial venture in Iraq with a supposed “global war on terror” waged to defend the American people against another 9/11.

To sustain such a fiction, fresh evidence of terrorist threats is periodically required. And it has been forthcoming on a regular basis. Every several months another “conspiracy” is unveiled, invariably involving an FBI informant and hapless individuals ensnared in a plot orchestrated by the government.

Until now, these “sting” operations have been targeted at Muslim immigrants. Last month, for example, Pakistani immigrant Shahawar Siraj in New York City was found guilty of plotting to blow up the Herald Square subway station in a “plot” that the evidence indicated was based entirely on suggestions from an FBI informant.

The FBI agent provocateur taunted the defendant with photographs of Abu Ghraib torture victims and demanded to know how, as a Muslim, he could fail to take action.

Similarly, in Albany, New York two years ago, the FBI recruited a Pakistani immigrant, promising him leniency on minor fraud charges, to ensnare two other immigrants in a fictitious scheme to help a non-existent person buy a weapon for a fake terrorist plot.
These provocations and conspiracies are symptomatic of a government that is both ruthless and desperate. Confronting a population that is increasingly hostile to its political agenda of reaction at home and war abroad, it is driven to manufacture an endless series of terrorist threats aimed at disorienting and intimidating public opinion.

Visitem meu outro BLOG, exclusivamente em portugues

Visit my other BLOG, which is in Portuguese only.

Friday, June 23, 2006

La fiesta del fútbol

La fiesta del fútbol
Armando Montenegro


El impacto del campeonato mundial de fútbol en todo el planeta es enorme. Más de 3.000 millones de personas vieron su inauguración en televisión y, día a día, todo el mundo sigue, paso a paso, sus resultados y sus novedades. No hay ningún evento, político, religioso, cultural o deportivo, que tenga este poder de convocatoria (por las dudas, las olimpiadas hace rato se quedaron atrás).

Una de las razones del éxito del campeonato es que promueve la exaltación y el avivamiento de los nacionalismos. Invita a jugar con fuego, pero en forma pacífica y transitoria. No es más que un vehículo para que se dé una confrontación desarmada entre los distintos países. Convoca a la gente de todo el mundo para que grite por sus banderas, celebre sus triunfos y llore con sus derrotas. Pero nada más.

Es un escenario donde no prima la jerarquía del dinero, del poder militar, de la tecnología o de la diplomacia. No hay en el mundo ningún otro lugar donde se permita, por ejemplo, que la República Checa venza y humille a Estados Unidos o que los ecuatorianos encuentren, por unos días, que su país es respetado y temido en el plano mundial. El fútbol, en una palabra, es lo que permite que los argentinos encuentren el lugar que creen que merecen en el planeta.

Aparte del explosivo pero incruento estímulo a las nacionalidades, el mundial de fútbol es uno de los pocos eventos que permiten crear y consagrar héroes en la mitología popular de todo el planeta (en realidad, aparte del deporte y de la música, ahora es difícil que se formen héroes; los de la antigüedad fueron guerreros, pero hoy las guerras, cada vez más tecnológicas, han desterrado para siempre las posibilidades de acciones heroicas de los individuos). En la memoria colectiva, hechos como la “mano de Dios” o los goles de Pelé o Maradona, que se comentan y se repiten en todo el globo, ocupan hoy el lugar que en el pasado tuvieron las luchas de Aquiles y Héctor y las aventuras de Ulises (nadie se acuerda, y con razón, de los generales o capitanes de las últimas guerras, ni siquiera los de las nuestras que son más artesanales; es mil veces más famoso el Pibe que cualquiera de nuestros militares o políticos).

A raíz de la tiranía de los horarios del campeonato, la vida se altera en todo el mundo. Los colegios se suspenden y las jornadas laborales se cambian para permitir que la gente de todos los continentes pueda seguir los partidos (hasta el sueño se modifica en donde los partidos se transmiten a la hora de dormir). Durante un mes todo está patas arriba.

De la locura colectiva en todos los continentes, amarrada efectivamente por la televisión, se escapan parcialmente tres grandes países: Estados Unidos, China e India. El primero porque sus habitantes se concentran en sus propios deportes, no han logrado interesarse masivamente en el soccer y, además, su equipo en Alemania tiene una calidad lastimosa. China, como en todo, está progresando rápidamente, pero aún le falta. De India no se sabe nada.

Como en todo, hay mucha gente que considera que todo este ruido del fútbol, su demagogia, sus gritos, sus héroes, es demasiado vulgar y estridente. Son las personas que encuentran placer en no ver televisión ni estar enteradas de nada de lo que pasa en el mundial. Mientras tanto, los demás esperamos que vengan buenos partidos, que Argentina y Brasil saquen a relucir todo su poderío y que surja toda la magia de sus grandes jugadores. Esperamos tener unos días de fantasía, claro, de mentiras, pues sabemos que después, cuando todo termine, seguirá la vida, la de siempre, hasta el próximo mundial, dentro de cuatro años.

Adán y Evo

Adán y Evo
Alejandro Gaviria

Hace algunos días, el diario madrileño El País publicó una breve nota sobre el borrador de la nueva constitución boliviana que el presidente Evo Morales presentará a la asamblea constituyente que será elegida el próximo mes de julio. La nueva constitución incluye, entre otras cosas, la nacionalización de la tierra, la promulgación del aimara y el quechua como lenguas oficiales, y la declaración de la “voluntad indeclinable” de Bolivia de conseguir una salida al Pacífico. En su concepción actual, la constitución en ciernes busca también “anteponer los derechos colectivos y de los pueblos a los derechos individuales”. En otras palabras, Evo Morales aspira a refundar la nación boliviana sobre la base de una utopía comunitaria. Sobre un mundo feliz de todos para uno y uno para todos. Sobre una quimera romántica de armonía fraternal.

Pero la búsqueda de utopías comunitarias, cabe decirlo de una vez, siempre ha terminado en lo mismo: en desilusión y disolución. A finales del siglo XIX y comienzos del siglo XX, un sinnúmero de comunidades utópicas inspiradas en doctrinas colectivistas proliferaron en los Estados Unidos. Todas fracasaron ineluctablemente como consecuencia de los irrefrenables impulsos individualistas y las consecuentes tensiones internas. Según la evidencia compilada por Steven Pinker, las comunidades motivadas por ideas socialistas (similares a las de Evo) desaparecieron al cabo de dos años en promedio. Las inspiradas en ideologías religiosas fueron más estables. Pero ninguno de los intentos quiméricos prosperó. En tiempos más recientes, los kibbutz israelitas (inspirados en una mezcla de sionismo y socialismo) terminaron desechando sus pretensiones colectivistas, que amenazaban con convertirlos, según un miembro desencantado, en paraísos de parásitos. Todos para uno y uno para nadie.

Desde una perspectiva más general, los antropólogos (sobre todo aquellos adeptos a la realidad) han mostrado que, en todas las culturas, los hombres y las mujeres (sin distinción) buscan sistemáticamente la prosperidad individual, muchas veces a expensas del bienestar comunal. Las luchas de poder, la competencia sexual, las mentiras y las traiciones son constantes universales. Los biólogos evolutivos han mostrado, de otro lado, que el sacrificio individual en aras del bienestar del grupo es una imposibilidad teórica: un infiltrado egoísta siempre dejará más descendientes que sus contrapartes colectivistas y terminará, tarde o temprano, legando su inveterado individualismo a toda la comunidad. En suma, el individualismo no es una opción ideológica, sino un atributo antropológico. Diga lo que diga la constitución de una nación suramericana.

Hace ya varios años, el poeta y ensayista ruso Joseph Brodsky le escribió una carta abierta al entonces presidente de la república checa, Vaclav Havel, carta que podría copiarse, casi en su totalidad, al presidente de la república boliviana Evo Morales: “(la discusión anterior) traducida al lenguaje del común significa simplemente que el hombre es peligroso. Además de ser una nota de pie de página a la obra de nuestro amado Rousseau, este principio puede servirnos para construir … un orden social fundado sobre unas bases menos autocomplacientes que las habituales, y posiblemente con menores consecuencias desastrosas. … Quizás el verdadero civismo, señor Presidente, consista en no crear ilusiones”.

Pero seguramente Evo insistirá en los postulados autocomplacientes con consecuencias desastrosas (la fragmentación definitiva de su país, por ejemplo). Y la izquierda infantil seguirá confundiendo la redención social (una necesidad) con la utopía comunal (una necedad). Cabe, en todo caso, reiterar lo dicho: desde el mismo albor de nuestra creación, fuimos expulsados para siempre del paraíso comunitario que un presidente boliviano pretende ahora crear por decreto.

Regain du populisme latino-américain, par Paulo A. Paranagua

Regain du populisme latino-américain, par Paulo A. Paranagua
LE MONDE | 23.06.06 | 13h28 • Mis à jour le 23.06.06 | 13h28

Lors du second tour de l'élection présidentielle au Pérou, le 4 juin, l'ancien président Alan Garcia, qui l'a emporté face au nationaliste Ollanta Humala, a été, par souci pédagogique, étiqueté "social-démocrate". A vrai dire, le scrutin péruvien était un cas d'école, puisqu'il opposait deux représentants d'un même phénomène : le populisme. M. Garcia est en effet le leader de l'Alliance populaire révolutionnaire américaine (APRA). Fondée en 1924, l'APRA prônait la lutte contre "l'impérialisme américain" et "la nationalisation des terres et de l'industrie". Obligée de se battre sur deux fronts - à la fois contre les militaires et contre les communistes -, l'APRA préfigurait les mouvements nationalistes qui proliférèrent après la crise de 1929.

Au Mexique, les caudillos de la révolution de 1910 ont mis du temps à trouver la manière de se perpétuer sans recourir aux armes. Ainsi le général Lazaro Cardenas, président du Mexique de 1934 à 1940, a donné une base sociale au Parti révolutionnaire institutionnel (PRI) par la réforme agraire et la nationalisation du pétrole. En contrepartie, l'Etat a assuré son emprise sur les syndicats. La vache à lait pétrolière a permis au PRI de régner sans partage pendant soixante et onze ans.

Au Brésil, Getulio Vargas, qui est parvenu au pouvoir par la force (1930-1945) puis y est revenu par les urnes (1950-1954), a joué la double carte du nationalisme et de la redistribution des revenus. Les partisans de ce président très charismatique, qui n'ont pas hésité à s'appeler eux-mêmes "getulistes", ont dominé la vie politique brésilienne pendant trois ou quatre décennies.

A l'instar de l'APRA, la dictature de Getulio Vargas s'est battue sur deux fronts : à gauche, contre le Parti communiste brésilien, qui a tenté un coup d'Etat militaire en 1935 ; à droite, contre la bourgeoisie libérale de Sao Paulo et le mouvement fasciste. A l'arrivée, M. Vargas a favorisé l'industrialisation, notamment dans la sidérurgie, en faisant jouer un rôle moteur à l'Etat. Face à la superproduction de café, après le krach de Wall Street, Getulio Vargas réoriente les investissements vers les manufactures, force la main des banques ou des chefs d'entreprise et contrôle les syndicats par une législation inspirée de la Carta del lavoro (charte du travail) mussolinienne.

L'Argentine représente le troisième cas. En première ligne dans le coup d'Etat militaire de 1943, le général Juan Peron, qui veut incarner la "troisième alternative" entre le capitalisme et le communisme, est président de 1946 à 1955 puis de 1973 jusqu'à sa mort, en 1974. "Grenier du monde", l'Argentine s'industrialise et s'urbanise et sort de la seconde guerre mondiale avec un trésor public pléthorique. Les premières années du péronisme sont considérées par les salariés comme un âge d'or. Mais elles seront suivies par dix-huit ans d'ostracisme.

Au pouvoir ou dans l'opposition, le péronisme marque la vie politique argentine depuis soixante ans. Durant ces dernières années, le parti péroniste a été incarné aussi bien par l'ancien président Carlos Menem, qui a mené des privatisations "néolibérales", voire mafieuses, que par l'actuel chef de l'Etat, Nestor Kirchner, qui a réhabilité les victimes de la dictature militaire.

La longévité des partis populistes montre que le président vénézuélien, Hugo Chavez, porté aux nues par l'extrême gauche européenne, n'a pas innové. Contrairement à l'Europe, où le terme populisme est souvent associé à des mouvements à droite de l'échiquier politique, en Amérique latine le phénomène a toujours été ambivalent.

Ainsi, au Pérou, M. Humala prétend n'être "ni de droite ni de gauche, mais d'en bas". En Colombie, le président conservateur Alvaro Uribe - qui s'est fait réélire haut la main le 28 mai - montre la même disposition que son homologue vénézuélien à s'adresser directement au peuple. La radio chère à Getulio Vargas et à Evita Peron a été remplacée par la télévision, mais la volonté de tisser un lien direct avec les "masses" perdure, dans un contexte de crise des partis traditionnels.

L'APANAGE DE DÉMOCRATIES FRAGILES

Le cours du baril de brut donne des ailes au "chavisme" et favorise son prosélytisme international. Sans la moindre transparence, l'argent du pétrole alimente les programmes sociaux et arrose les "amis de la révolution bolivarienne", au détriment d'investissements susceptibles de développer une économie qui ne dépendrait plus uniquement de la rente énergétique. Le populisme stimule la corruption, car les contrôles institutionnels sont court-circuités. La compagnie publique Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) a pourtant des difficultés à atteindre les quotas de production de l'OPEP (Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole) et à exploiter les réserves off shore ou le bassin de l'Orénoque, sans recourir à des investissements étrangers.

La rhétorique chaviste serait aussi risible que la péroniste, naguère, si les propos belliqueux du comandante Chavez n'étaient pas accompagnés d'une militarisation de la société, par l'embrigadement des partisans, la diabolisation et la marginalisation de l'opposition. Le populisme oscille entre l'autoritarisme et la dictature. "Les individus n'ont pas de droits, mais des devoirs ! Les droits appartiennent à la collectivité", proclamait déjà Getulio Vargas en 1938. "D'abord la patrie, puis le mouvement (péroniste), et ensuite les hommes", soutenait Juan Peron en 1950.

Toutefois, distinguer une gauche réformiste, qui privilégie le consensus et les coalitions, par rapport à un populisme enclin à la confrontation, n'épuise pas la question. Il ne permet pas de prévoir où va la Bolivie sous la présidence d'Evo Morales, tiraillé entre son envahissant mentor Hugo Chavez et ses voisins, Brésil et Argentine. Il ne permet guère d'anticiper l'orientation d'Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, si le candidat de la gauche emporte l'élection présidentielle au Mexique, le 2 juillet.

Tendance inhérente à la politique latino-américaine, le populisme est l'apanage de démocraties fragiles. L'antidote reste une société civile vigoureuse, un système de partis et d'organisations sociales qui ne soient pas les instruments d'ambitions personnelles. Mais une évolution est toujours possible, dans un sens comme dans l'autre. Sans le soutien du Parti des travailleurs et du centre-gauche, une dérive populiste du président brésilien, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, n'est pas impossible. Et inversement : à ce titre, l'étiquette "social-démocrate" accolée à M. Garcia s'applique bien à la transformation de l'APRA, à défaut de correspondre à l'origine de son parti.


Paulo A. Paranagua
Article paru dans l'édition du 24.06.06

Thursday, June 22, 2006

The BBC's in-depth look at urban life

Most disquieting is the urban population counter they placed on this page.

Wednesday, June 21, 2006

DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT ON U.S. ROLE IN BRAZIL'S 1964 MILITARY COUP

Audio tape: President Johnson urged taking "every step that we can" to support overthrow of Joao Goulart

U.S. Ambassador Requested Pre-positioned Armaments to aid Golpistas; Acknowledged covert operations backing street demonstrations, civic forces and resistance groups

Edited by Peter Kornbluh
pkorn@gwu.edu / 202 994-7116

TUPAMAROS Y MONTONEROS

I found the following text at the link above. So far, I do not know to what book the Chapter 11 mentioned below belongs, nor who wrote it.

CAPÍTULO 11
TUPAMAROS Y MONTONEROS

El 10 de enero de 1961 se produjo en Montevideo una manifestación anti-castrista que fue embestida por cuadrillas comunistas armadas que habían recibido orientaciones de la embajada de Cuba sancionadas por la legación diplomática soviética. Con evidentes pruebas, el gobierno uruguayo expulsa al embajador cubano Mario García Incháustegui y al diplomático soviético Mijail Samailov.

Poco después dos miembros de los comandos armados comunistas, Carmelo Taffuri y Bernardo Simaldoni, llevaron a cabo un atentado que costó la vida al síndico Oscar Alonso y a su familia. Los asesinos recibieron refugio en Cuba ante la indignación del gobierno de Montevideo.

Alrededor de 1962, surgen en Uruguay los grupos guerrilleros originales. El de mayor relevancia resulta el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, más conocido por los Tupamaros. Irónicamente, los pistoleros urbanos de los Tupamaros estarán especialmente compuestos por activistas de la peonada rural. Su original creador lo fue un alumno de leyes llamado Raúl Sendic, el cual se había ocupado en los años sesenta como cortador de caña de azúcar.

Cuando, entre 1962 y 1963, Sendic y otros dirigentes establecen en Uruguay el MLN, la generalidad de sus integra ntes provenía del socialismo uruguayo. No obstante el MLN incluía marxistas, cristianos de apostura radical y trotskistas. A instancias de Jorge Manera Lluveras, el PC da a luz un cuerpo de autodefensa basado en el ensayo guerrillero de Cuba y Argelia. Este dispositivo se suma a una coalición de bandos subversivos: los Tupamaros de Sendic, el MIR (uruguayo) de Washington Rodríguez Belletti, el MAC de Fernández Huidobro, el FAU de Gerardo Gatti, y el Independiente de Rubén Navillat.

En 1962, Sendic dirige en Montevideo una serie de marchas populares cañeras demandando mejoras a los dueños de plantaciones. Al malograrse este impulso, decidirá emplear la táctica de la violencia y en julio de 1963, parangonando a Castro, lleva a cabo un asalto en un club de cazadores. Identificado por la policía, Sendic se destierra en la Argentina, para retornar al Uruguay a fines de 1964 y proseguir su faena de crear escuadras de guerrilla urbana. Sus primeros reclutas fueron jornaleros cañeros y gremios de las plantaciones azucareras, o sea sus viejos camaradas de empeño.

Conjuntamente con los Tupamaros brotan también otras agrupaciones, como la anarquista Organización Revolucionaria 33 Orientales, opuesta a los comicios y que encauzaba su acción en los sindicatos; las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Orientales, que respondía totalmente a La Habana; el Frente Revolucionario de los Trabajadores; "El 22 de diciembre" que era una escisión de los Tupamaros; y por último los maoístas de las Agrupaciones Rojas.

En el año 1963 los comunistas se deciden a alistar su brazo armado y emprenden el envío de cuadros militantes a la URSS para educarles militarmente; práctica que se mantendrá vigente durante años, paralela a la preparación guerrera interna de sus miembros, a orillas del río Olimar. El capital para los pertrechos proviene de la embajada cubana, que a su vez contribuye a levantar una pequeña fábrica de explosivos. Hugo Pagani, ente clave de la operación y contacto con los cubanos, confesó luego públicamente toda esta trama.

Ya para 1964 se compone el instrumento armado del partido comunista bajo la jurisdicción de Nestor Leites y Aurelio Pérez González. Pérez González había consumado un viaje a la URSS el año anterior para recibir cursillos de manejo y utilización de armas, disciplina y nociones de táctica. El órgano bélico clandestino contaba ya con 700 militantes.

El grupo de Sendic asumirá la designación de Tupamaros en 1965, a raíz del sabotaje a la fábrica farmacéutica Bayer en Montevideo, en protesta a la escalada de los Estados Unidos en Vietnam. El nombre procede del inca Tupac Amaru, caudillo anticolonial del siglo XVIII. Los combatientes de Sendic no fueron los primeros en servirse del nombre Tupamaros: ya desde la gesta de independencia de principios del siglo diecinueve José Artigas, héroe y creador de la nación uruguaya había dado a su movimiento tal denominación.

Los Tupamaros se pueblan con jóvenes procedentes de la clase media, profesionales y estudiantes universitarios. En su momento cumbre llegaron a tener alrededor de 4000 militantes. Con Sendic operaba Raúl Brigadián, ligado secretamente a la DGI cubana. A pesar de ello, el MLN de Sendic no gozaba aun de la total confianza de Castro, quien en 1968 se inclinaba hacia el Movimiento Revoluc ionario Oriental de Ariel Collazo.

Será la mano del aventurero argentino Joe Baxter la que transformará a los Tupamaros de una colectividad insurreccional agraria en una maquinaria clandestina urbana. Baxter se había refugiado en Montevideo después del asalto del Banco Policlínico de Buenos Aires, y se sumó a los Tupamaros como aliado. Baxter se mantenía enlazado con Abrahán Guillén, hombre fuerte de La Habana, quien tenía asociación con la organización argentina Tacuara.

En 1966 tiene lugar una convención nacional revolucionaria uruguaya en la cual colisionan dos posiciones: la tendencia por la vía armada, y la del MIR y de las juventudes socialistas que favorecían un frente de masas. En esos momentos Collazo era la persona de crédito de Cuba en el Uruguay y los vínculos del Partido Comunista y los Tupamaros se efectuaban a través de él. Collazo seleccionará aquellos integrantes de su movimiento para recibir cursos de guerrilla rural.

Pero la imposibilidad de una contienda rural en el Uruguay determina que casi todos los componentes de la facción de Collazo se integren a los Tupamaros. En 1966 los Tupamaros perpetran el desfalco al banco la Caja Obrera y en noviembre del mismo año el saqueo a la armería El Cazador. En diciembre se origina un áspero tropiezo de los Tupamaros con la policía que los obliga pasar a la clandestinidad.

El distanciamiento del MLN de sus raíces se hace más incuestionable tras la detención de Sendic y con la entrada en escena del intelectual comunista Marcos Rosencof Silverman. Rosencof emerge como líder de la organización; Engler Golofchenco, de origen ucrania no, pasa a ser su segundo. Rosencof era un hombre del Partido que ofrecía en este momento difícil de los Tupamaros los santuarios para que su dirigencia pudiese operar desde la clandestinidad.

El presidente del partido comunista Arismendi, a la sazón el teórico marxista continental más reputado, junto con Collazo sostienen reuniones por separado con los Tupamaros para gestionar, a nombre de Castro, que los mismos se incorporasen a la guerrilla boliviana del Che Guevara. Los Tupamaros no aceptan, pero el aparato militar del partido comunista envía un pequeño contingente de 18 militantes para ser aleccionados militarmente en Cuba, con vistas a prestar luego ayuda al Che Guevara.

Arismendi había reunido incluso armas y ayuda en dinero de Cuba para este guión de violencia del Cono Sur. Asimismo, el partido comunista uruguayo fue clave en el diseño de la guerrilla boliviana. Fueron ellos los que prestaron apoyo y logística al Che Guevara ocultándolo en Uruguay antes de pasar a Bolivia, entregándole dos pasaportes extraídos de la cancillería uruguaya para cubrir su identidad.

En el prólogo al diario del Che Guevara en Bolivia, Castro se refiere a Arismendi, cuyo nombre clave en esta operación era Simón. El mismo Che Guevara en sus apuntes del 14 de febrero relata lo siguiente1 "se me informa, además, que Simón ha manifestado su decisión de ayudarnos, independientemente de lo que resuelva el Partido".

La OLAS inauguró su sede en Uruguay a través del Instituto Cultural Uruguayo-Soviético. Pero el partido comunista realmente no tenía arraigo popular entre los uruguayos. EL cerebro del PCU, Guillermo Bodner, decide entonces que era tiempo de hacerse espacio en las fuerzas armadas. Lo hará valiéndose de José Luis Massera y Alberto Altesor.

En 1966 tiene lugar una importante y nutrida reunión entre los líderes de los Tupamaros y Castro, donde se acordó proporcionar entrenamiento guerrillero en Cuba a esta organización. El problema de quién controla a los Tupamaros pasó a ser un punto de polémica entre los diferentes tablados políticos uruguayos. Tanto el PCU, primero mediante Rosencof y luego de Arismendi, como Castro valiéndose de Collazo trataban de controlar al movimiento.

Con Rosencof los Tupamaros dan el paso hacia la guerra irregular bajo la tutela comunista. Rosencof operaba utilizando a la soviética Efgeniya Dumnova; Dumnova había tenido relaciones con un general de la KGB, y en 1940 se había casado en Moscú con Jaime Juanarena, funcionario del gobierno uruguay o. Asimismo, un pequeño grupo de militares, como el general Liber Seregni, eran miembros de la célula secreta del Partido Comunista Uruguayo que integraba Arismendi. El escritor uruguayo Mario Benedetti fungía como el enlace directo entre Cuba, el MLN y el PC uruguayo.

Es el momento en que el PC y todo el espectro izquierda uruguayo acoge la viabilidad de la vía armada, y se envía a sus militantes a programas de preparamiento militar en Cuba, los cuales se amplían en 1967. Se formará además un equipo técnico de inteligencia y contra inteligencia, de falsificación de documentos y transformación de la identidad física, comunicaciones cifradas y escrituras invisibles2. A la vez, en la escuela soviética del KOMSOMOL se ejercitó a jóvenes comunistas uruguayos para perfilar y operar en combate de guerrilla, ejecución de terrorismo y sabotaje.

En la mayoría de los casos, los escogidos se trasladan a Cuba vía Chile con el patrocinio de la Columna Gaucha del MLN. Los agentes del MLN Carlos María Gutiérrez, Carlos Núñez y Eduardo Galeano operaban con la cobertura de periodistas de Prensa Latina, la agencia cubana de noticias. Los embarques bélicos se reciben a través de la Argentina en los bidones de gasolina de los camiones; las remesas despachadas clandestinamente por Cuba al partido comunista entraban por mar de forma sistemática.

Cuba generaliza la formación de especialistas para montar en los países objetivos mini-fábricas rudimentarias de explosivos y utilería de guerra, introduciendo con ello considerable flexibilidad y autonomía para los montajes internacionales. Ya para mediados de 1967 los Tupamaros disponen en territorio uruguayo de una de tales mini-fábricas.

En febrero de 1968 se realiza la segunda convención nacional tupamara donde se confirma la dirección existente que integraban Sendic, Julio Marenales, Huidobro y Manera Lluveras. En ese momento los Tupamaros computan unos 250 miembros activos, alrededor de 30 de ellos operando en total clandestinidad.

En 1968 se dan cita en Moscú todos los partidos comunistas latinoamericanos para examinar la situación general del continente. Los soviéticos presionan porque se brinde apoyo y se coordine con La Habana la agenda de la revolución. Entre las reuniones individuales más destacadas figuró la de Cuba y los soviéticos con Rosencof y Arismendi, representando a los Tupamaros y al PCU, respectivamente para constituir una estructura militar unida con el sostén logístico y de inteligenc ia de Cuba.

Hasta 1968, los Tupamaros se dedicaban a reclutar y adquirir pertrechos y recursos financieros, y estaban ordenados en células o escuadras que actuaban independientes unas de otras. En lo adelante, el modelo de acción tupamaro resultará exitoso debido al apoyo de La Habana, donde habían instalado su Estado Mayor. Los cubanos les preparan una red logística internacional que les facilita contactos, transporte y santuarios; y a su vez les asesoran en un nuevo método: el secuestro y juicio de hombres públicos y de empresa “a nombre del pueblo”, con altas cifras de rescate, parte del cual siempre pasaba a La Habana.

Así, a partir de 1968 los Tupamaros se precipitan en una estocada a fondo para desestabilizar la administración del entonces presidente uruguayo Jorge Pacheco Areco. En septiembre atacan el casino de Carrasco; en los primeros días de 1969 ocupan la sede del juzgado donde se instruyen las causas contra la organización; el 14 de febrero atracan la tienda Financiera Monty, y cuatro días después repiten la acción en el casino de San Rafael.

Para conmemorar la muerte del Che Guevara el 8 de octubre de 1969, los Tupamaros realizan lo que será su acción de mayor envergadura: la toma del poblado de Pando. El asalto se realiza de forma espectacular: los terroristas entraron en la ciudad como parte de un cortejo fúnebre, copando luego diversos sitios como la comisaría y el cuartel de bomberos. Terminaran robando los bancos y destruyendo las líneas telefónicas.

En 1970, La Habana consuma los ajustes para la famosa Mesa Redonda donde estarán envueltos los Tupamaros y el FARO de Uruguay, el MIR de Chile, el ELN de Bolivia (cuyo líder, "Chato" Peredo había sido guerrillero del Che Guevara), los Montoneros, la FAR y la FAP argentinas, el ALN de Brasil, el Ejército de Liberación de Colombia (ELC) y la FALN venezolana de Douglas Bravo.

Esta Mesa Redonda adopta alentar la violencia urbana y rural en todo el Cono Sur, y en especial en Brasil y Bolivia; conduce también al contrabando de armas en el vecino Paraguay por parte de un grupo mixto de argentinos y uruguayos3. Se decide que, a diferencia del trazado original del Che Guevara, el comando internacional solo coordinará las operaciones sin interferir directamente en la táctica y autonomía de cada organización.

El primero de agosto de 1970, el diario cubano Granma4 publica el mensaje que remite el Chato Peredo a los Tupamaros, en agradecimiento por la ayuda que la Mesa Redonda había concedido en apoyo de las acciones del segundo foco guerrillero en Bolivia, iniciadas con la sanguinaria irrupción a Teoponte, una pacífica comunidad minera cerca de La Paz.

En esta contienda, los bolivianos del Chato Peredo toman como rehenes a dos ingenieros alemanes, intercambiándolos por diez prisioneros políticos, que rápidamente son enviados a Cuba. Pero, el ejército boliviano prueba nuevamente ser un adversario formidable y en una rápida campaña que termina en octubre de 1970, las bandas armadas fueron totalmente exterminadas con la captura del Chato Peredo.

La estrategia de la Mesa Redonda se hace sentir incluso en Venezuela, donde gestó un engendro terrorista conocido como Punto Cero, nombre del cuartel donde recibieron preparación en Cuba. Pero, la fuerza de seguridad de Venezuela, da cuenta con rapidez de esta intentona. Asimismo, Cuba trata de fomentar la clandestinidad urbana en Panamá, que se anota el asesinato del dirigente Floyd Britton y lleva a cabo una cadena de robos en bancos y casinos, hasta que la Guardia Nacional los aniquila en octubre de 1970, cuando dos miembros del movimiento entrenados por los cubanos resultan muertos y otros 29 capturados.



LA GUERRILLA URBANA

En julio-agosto de 1970 los Tupamaros secuestran al cónsul brasileño Aloysio Días Gomide y al norteamericano Dan Mitrione, experto en seguridad. El apresamiento de Días Gomide busca el intercambio de prisioneros políticos brasileños y un rescate destinado a las guerrillas de Brasil. Mitrione fue apresado al salir de su casa; al resultar herido, los Tupamaros tendrán que transportarlo a uno de sus hospitales de campaña. El gobierno movilizó a 15,000 efectivos en la más colosal cacería humana de la historia uruguaya. Los Tupamaros exigieron a cambio de Mitrione la libertad de todos sus miembros detenidos y su salvoconducto al Perú.

El mismo día que finaliza el plazo establecido, el presidente Areco pronunciaría una locución radial y televisiva en la que rechazaba cualquier negociación con los Tupamaros. El viernes 7 de agosto, el grueso de la dirección de los Tupamaros es detenido en medio de una vasta redada; ese mismo día, los Tupamaros le echan mano al técnico norteamericano Claude Fly.

A mediodía del domingo 9 de agosto de 1970, Mitrione fue sacado de su prisión del pueblo a bordo de un vehículo que conducía Aurelio Fernández y en el que le esperaba Antonio Más, quien sería su ejecutor. En el trayecto, Más le disparó cuatro balazos. El auto y el cadáver fueron abandonados en los suburbios de Montevideo. El año 1971 se inicia con un rosario de secuestros que les permite canjear rehenes por parte de su directiva en prisión. Así, el 8 de enero es apresado a punta de pistola el embajador de la Gran Bretaña, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, quien se unirá a los rehenes Días Gomide y Fly.

Las relaciones entre Cuba y los Tupamaros se fortalecen. Los dirigentes Rosencof y Luis Martirena se trasladarán a La Habana en 1971 en busca de mayor apoyo material. Castro se compromete con esta petición, con la cual se esperaba asestar un golpe mortal al régimen uruguayo. Si bien los Tupamaros se habían anotado numerosos éxitos en su estrategia de terror y subversión la marea se tornará en su contra pese al intenso auxilio proveniente de La Habana. Los Tupamaros, un tanto acorralados, desatan el famoso "plan Hipólito" por el cual se ajusticiará a quienes se promulgasen en contra de sus ideas.

La imagen de los Tupamaros tanto en Uruguay como en el extranjero, irá resquebrajándose ya sea por los asesinatos políticos como por las derrotas que vienen encajando frente a la policía uruguaya. Internamente se entra en una fase de escisiones intestinas debido a la presencia de diversas fuerzas externas, como la de los comunistas, los servicios cubanos y la KGB.

La riña entre el ucraniano Rosencof y la cabecilla tupamara María "la Parda" Topolansky precipitará la expulsión de un considerable número de miembros, donde figuran la Parda Topolansy, Rodríguez Larreta, Romans Lederman y otros, precisamente cuando los servicios secretos soviéti cos, apoyados por el PC chileno, se enfrascaban en una maniobra especial contra el MIR chileno y el Departamento de América, dirigido por Piñeiro.

La regencia tupamara desde los calabozos ordena a sus aún activas escuadras que se establezcan en los medios rurales, donde deberán edificar refugios subterráneos para la diligencia guerrillera. Bajo la tutela de Manera Lluveras se lleva a cabo un plan de fuga masivo del recinto penal de Punta Carretas. Ciento seis prisioneros Tupamaros, entre ellos Sendic, escapan de la cárcel el 6 de septiembre. Ese es el momento preciso en que la suerte se tornará fatal para el movimiento subversivo tupamaro. Tres días después de la fuga, el gobierno uruguayo hará despliegue de drásticas medidas de contrainsurgencia con violencia inusitada, cogiendo desprevenida a la guerrilla.

A fines de octubre de 1971, el PC uruguayo decide apoyar al ex general del ejército Seregni en su candidatura a la presidencia. Pero si Seregni era derrotado en las elecciones se pondría en práctica un levantamiento militar con los comunistas, apoyados por los Tupamaros y algunos sindicatos obreros5. El propio Castro preparó su visita a Chile y su arribo a Santiago para las vísperas de las elecciones en Uruguay, dando por sentado la victoria marxista. Castro pensaba volar a Montevideo para festejar junto a Arismendi el triunfo en las urnas6. Sin embargo ninguno de los involucrados pensó en la aplastante derrota que se produjo esa noche en Montevideo. La coalición del Frente Amplio apenas logró el 17% de los votos. Desmoralizados por completo, sus principales militantes desaparecerán para siempre de la escena publica.

El líder tupamaro Adolfo Wassen Alaniz se desplazó rápidamente a Santiago de Chile para entrevistarse urgentemente con un irritado Castro para analizar las dificultades que ya estaba atravesando la organización tras la derrota electoral que demostraba el poco apoyo popular a los "revolucionarios" y la intensificación de la campaña contrainsurgente del gobierno. En un acto desesperado, los Tupamaros se trasladaron a la zona rural que resultaría inapropiada para las maniobras de sus fuerzas, y donde estaban a merced del ejército. Finalmente, en abril de 1972, el nuevo presidente Juan María Bordaberry declara el estado de guerra interna.

Ante la dilatación de algunos pedidos a Cuba, los Tupamaros en plena desmoralización, enviaron nuevamente a Rosencof a conferenciar con Castro para que los sacara del atolladero. Si bien recibirían armas vía Chile así como socorro financiero, Castro torció el brazo a Rosencof para fundir los Tupamaros en un frente de las izquierdas. Con ello, y sin proponérselo realmente, los Tupamaros sucumbieron a la red internacional soviética.

A fines de abril de 1973, el gobierno cubano requirió una reunión en La Habana de los Tupamaros con el ánimo de esclarecer la ruta política y militar que éstos debían conducir a la luz de las acciones del gobierno uruguayo. En esa reunión Castro orientó que los líderes centrales del movimiento escaparan del Uruguay y se agregasen a otras organizaciones terroristas del área. Para ese entonces los comandantes Tupamaros ya se habían domiciliados en La Habana y en Buenos Aires.

Tras la caída de Allende, el PC uruguayo envió una brigada de combatientes a Chile dirigida por Valenti Pitino, que debía sumarse a los focos de resistencia que los cubanos intentaron organizar en el norte del país. Pero el desmoronamiento del aparato marxista chileno fue tan rápido como el aborto de esta tentativa. En septiembre, cuando Sendic es capturado por segunda vez, ya se había quebrado el espinazo de la infraestructura tupamara. No obstante, se decide propulsar el invento cubano de las mini-fábricas de armamentos. Se determina que los especialistas Tupamaros en la construcción de armamentos y explosivos, regresen nuevamente a Cuba para perfeccionar el diseño de morteros de 60 milímetros., granadas de fusil antitanque, de plástico, minas antipersonales7.

Los Tupamaros se moverán en cuatro regiones: en Argentina, en Europa, en Cuba y en suelo uruguayo. El ramal europeo manejará la propaganda contra el Uruguay, mediante organizaciones internacionales defensoras de los derechos humanos y de presos políticos. En Argentina efectuarán reclutamientos y mantendrán contacto con organizaciones subversivas como el Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) de Mario Roberto Santucho, quien también se había preparado en Cuba8.

Los Tupamaros se hicieron de $60 millones del rescate pagado por el negociante italiano Gaetano Pellegrini en noviembre de 1969, y la suma de $250 millones en 1971 por el rescate del cónsul de Brasil en Montevideo Días Gomide. Parte de esos fondos fue a parar a Cuba; el resto sirvió entre otras cosas para favorecer al sandinismo que, según el propio Mario Firmenich, recibiría entre 1978 y 1979 decenas de millones de dólares9.

El revés de la insurgencia tupamara coincidió con la eliminación de los pronunciamientos subversivos pro-castristas en Argentina y Brasil y con la desaparición del santuario chileno de Allende. Muchos militantes Tupamaros se mudaron a Cuba donde seguirían recibiendo entrenamientos especiales. Posteriormente, algunos de estos activistas asistirían a Cuba en sus operaciones de inteligencia en Europa y América Latina. La evidente interferencia de Castro en los asuntos internos del Uruguay obligó al gobierno de Montevideo a votar en contra de que la OEA levantase las sanciones contra Cuba en noviembre de 1974.



LOS MONTONEROS

El Cono Sur del continente, y en especial la Argentina, fue trastornada por la nueva beligerancia guerrillera cubana. Así estaba previsto en los acuerdos de la OLAS: propiciar la lucha armada y promover las estrategias revolucionarias conjuntas. Cuba se dará a la tarea de estructurar agrupaciones terroristas urbanas que conformarán tentáculos clandestinos en varios países de América Latina, cuyo marco teórico residiría en el pensamiento del anarco-marxista Guillén y del brasileño Marighela.

En Argentina se originará entonces, con el condominio de los componentes de múltiples movimientos radicalizados, el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). La esencial comisión de ELN será hacerse sentir en las comarcas norteñas del país secundando los manejos del Che Guevara en Bolivia. A la muerte del Che Guevara y de su seguidor Inti Peredo y no teniendo la armazón creada un propósito especificó, el ELN se fragmenta en variados agregados que deciden proseguir con las contiendas salteadoras dentro del país.

Así comparecen a la luz de la opinión pública las tres organizaciones subversivas más potentes que han de consagrarse en el país: los Montoneros, las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) y el Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP).

Las célebres guerrillas urbanas confeccionadas por los Montoneros asumieron la estrategia cubana de enfrentar al imperialismo norteamericano a un nivel continental. En septiembre de 1968, el general cubano Rafael del Pino visitaba la Argentina al frente de la delegación oficial a las sesiones de la Organización de la Aviación Civil Internacional. Exilado más tarde, del Pino relatará los asiduos encuentros clandestinos que un miembro de la inteligencia cubana e integrante de aquella comisión, el "mayor Muñoz", sostuvo en Buenos Aires con los distintos partidos terroristas10 "durante nuestra permanencia en el país sudamericano Muñoz entregó fuertes sumas de dinero a diferentes organizaciones de izquierda, en especial a las fuerzas armadas peronistas que en aquellos momentos desarrollaban una febril actividad guerrillera en Tucumán".

Tras su participación en la famosa Mesa Redonda de los Tupamaros en 1970, los Montoneros obtienen subsidios de Cuba, lo que les da la potencialidad de precipitar una oleada de encuentros armados. El asesinato del directivo gremial Augusto Vandor en junio de 1969 marca nítidamente el preludio de una plena y coordinada ofensiva de violencia contra las instituciones del gobierno argentino.

Hay que considerar que en América Latina las conciencias estaban turbadas por una creciente divulgación de las ideas marxistas, con la consolidación del proceso cubano, el triunfo electoral de Allende y de la Unidad Popular en Chile, la subsistencia del gobierno nacionalista peruano y las dificultades en el Uruguay.

El 29 de mayo de 1970 a la una y media de la tarde, las emisoras de radio en Argentina interrumpían su programación para dar la conmovedora noticia del secuestro del general Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, ex presidente del país. En pleno día y en pleno centro de la capital, Aramburu fue detenido "a nombre del pueblo" por un equipo de peronistas encabezados por Firmenich. Esquivando puestos policiales y evitando caminos transitados, una camioneta Gladiator enfiló hacia Timote llevando escondido bajo una carga de fardos de pastos al general. Allí se le juzgó y fusiló.

Aramburu había sido el artífice del robo y desaparición del cadáver de Evita Perón. En la confesión hecha a sus captores, Aramburu declaró que los despojos estaban en un cementerio de Roma bajo nombre falso y en custodia del Vaticano, y que la documentación sobre el hurto del cadáver se hallaba en una caja de seguridad del Banco Central en Buenos Aires a nombre del coronel Cabanillas. Sin embargo, los Montoneros no pudieron obtener más detalles al respecto.

El real motivo para liquidar a Aramburu era su promoción del proyecto para reemplazar al régimen corporativista de Juan Carlos Onganía, y con ello dar un paso peligroso contra la oposición integrando el peronismo al sistema electoral. De concretarse el “plan Aramburu”, los subversivos peronistas quedaban sin opción estratégica, ilegitimándose la vía armada para la toma del poder. La exitosa conjura montonera había tomado casi un año entre planificación y vigilancia; con ella, lograron darse a conocer nacionalmente. Eliminado el cerebro y autor del movimiento anti-peronista, los Montoneros promulgaron la guerra irregular urbana y rural como único método a seguir.

El presidente Onganía no duró una semana al escándalo del secuestro. Al entierro de Aramburu asistió un nuevo presidente, el general Roberto Marcelo Levingston. La Argentina sería escenario de una ola terrorista y por consecuencia de una sucesión de pautas represivas por parte del gobierno que sacudió en sus cimientos al país.

A partir de este momento, los Montoneros se las agencian para extraer del sistema administrativo del país los recursos indispensables para costear la subversión, e intentar destruir paulatinamente el aparato económico a fin de lograr un empobrecimiento del ciudadano productor y el caos social. Otros hechos en marzo de 1970 suscitaron el interés del pueblo: el secuestro del ingeniero Yuri Pivovarov, representante comercial de la embajada soviética, y el fallido intento con el hijo del agregado civil de la embajada de la República de China.

Así llegó 1971, año en que la violencia aumenta y se diversifica: el apresamiento del gerente del frigorífico Swift, Stanley M. Farrer, en mayo de 1971; el asesinato del decano de la Fiat en Argentina, Oberdán Salustro un año después; la emboscada y ejecución del general Juan Carlos Sánchez y del político Roberto Mario Uzal, ambos en abril de 1972.

Durante el auge del pánico, los cubanos utilizaron su embajada en Buenos Aires para mantener sus vínculos con los Montoneros y con su dirigente Firmenich, así como con el ERP guiado por Santucho. La Habana brindó asesoría a estas organizaciones subversivas, así como entrenamiento táctico en guerrillas urbanas y rurales; se facilitaban los movimientos y las comunicaciones, alterando identidades personales y dando acceso a su valija diplomática. Asimismo, los funcionarios castristas propiciarían la conexión de los Montoneros con los palestinos, de quienes recibieron concurso adicional.

A principios de los años setenta, el agente cubano Roberto Cabrera actuando bajo cobertura diplomática en Buenos Aires era el correo entre los montoneros y el ERP. A Cabrera se le unirá luego el oficial del Departamento de América, Damián Arteaga Hernández. Por otra parte, la embajada cubana en Santiago de Chile se convertirá en el eslabón más importante en la red de apoyo internacional, de propaganda, de inteligencia y de financiamiento del MLN.

Entre 1970 y 1973, durante la férrea administración del general Alejandro A. Lanusse, los Montoneros y la FAR trataron de buscar en la masa peronista su materia vital. En ese lapso perpetraron 53 atentados personales; también las fuerzas armadas argentinas atacarían el poblado de Garín el 30 de julio de 1971. El círculo vicioso se tornaría cruento: por un lado caían miembros de la policía, y por otro lado eran ultimados o detenidos militantes de distintas organizaciones. Estas, a su vez, tomaban represalias sangrientas. Pero los Montoneros sufrían substanciales percances: los reveses iban sumando y la pequeña organización iba quedando desguarnecida.

El 11 de marzo de 1973 se celebran elecciones. La coalición de partidos que conformaban el Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI) orientados por los peronistas, conquista ampliamente la justa electoralista. Dos meses después, el nuevo gobierno del presidente Héctor Cámpora decreta la amnistía general para todos los presos que calificaba de políticos. Muchas de las infamantes matanzas de los Montoneros fueron consumadas con la excusa de llevar al país a las urnas, y empleando como lemas el regreso de Perón y "los militares a los cuarteles".

Al poco tiempo, el 20 de junio de 1973, se produce el fugaz retorno a la Argentina del general Perón poniendo fin a su exilio. Pero los amnistiados por Cámpora, locos de furor, tomarán nuevamente el camino de la fuerza, enfrentándose incluso con antiguos compañeros peronistas, como en el caso de Ezeiza, donde hubo abundante número de muertos y heridos. Ante la seria alternativa el presidente Cámpora y su vicepresidente Solano Lima, presentan sus renuncias con la anuencia de Perón. Les sucede por un brevísimo período el diputado Raúl Lastiri. Finalmente, el 12 de septiembre de 1973, Perón asciende a la presidencia tras un corto proceso electoral. Junto a él asumirá la vicepresidencia de la república su segunda esposa, María Isabel Martínez.

A pesar del arribo de la poderosa silueta de Perón al gobierno y de gozar de una ancha base popular, el terrorismo no se redujo. Con asombro y consternación, Perón viró las espaldas a la izquierda tradicional y declaró fuera de la ley a los grupos de guerrilleros pro-cubanos que le habían dado su apoyo para derrocar a la dictadura militar; éstos, con celeridad, replicaron con el asesinato del secretario general de la sindical peronista, José Rucci. Perón antepondría al terrorismo su singular poder para galvanizar a las multitudes. El abismo entre los peronistas y el ala izquierda compuesta por los montoneros, el FAP y la Juventud Peronista se hará definitivo.

El 14 de febrero de 1974, tras una laboriosa fase de preparación, los servicios secretos de Castro culminan la coalición de los movimientos sediciosos del Cono Sur. Se formará la Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (JCR) con la integración del Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Bolivia, el Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo de Argentina, el MIR chileno y los Tupamaros uruguayos. De inmediato la inteligencia cubana apuntala a la Junta Coordinadora desde varias metrópolis europeas, especialmente desde París, con el objetivo de facilitar el trasiego y lavado de dinero, propaganda, los desplazamientos y puntos de confluencia para los entrenamientos especiales en Cuba.

La Junta Coordinadora arregla sus bases abiertas y encubiertas en puntos geográficos de cada continente. Dentro del bloque soviético se escoge a Cuba y Checoslovaquia; para la América Latina, se hará en la Argentina, Panamá, Brasil, Perú y Paraguay; con vistas a cubrir Europa se ubicarán en España, Francia, Portugal, Italia y Suecia; para el continente africano, lo serán Libia y Tanzania. Con una robusta armazón europea de propaganda y con la tolerancia en los medios de prensa se desata una virulenta campaña contra el gobierno argentino. La actividad militar de los Montoneros se propone azotar las numerosas empresas extranjeras.

Perón decide reaccionar al impulso insurgente con la fuerza represiva militar, y se dictarán leyes y normas penales para las actividades terroristas. En un acto masivo del 1 de mayo de 1974, el rancio caudillo denuncia a los Montoneros calificándolos de mercenarios "de un país del área", y alertando contra la infiltración en el movimiento peronista.

El 1 de julio de 1974 fallece Perón, quedando en la presidencia su esposa María Isabel. Esta crisis del partido de gobierno es explotada inmediatamente por la oposición beligerante, especialmente en el campo psicológico y en el militar. En octubre de 1974, la FAR se fusiona a los Montoneros.



ARQUITECTURA DEL TERROR

En este período de gobierno peronista los Montoneros cumplirán múltiples atentados y secuestros extorsionistas. En marzo de 1974, un foco guerrillero de la ERP materializa el viejo sueño del caporal Santucho: utilizar el plano rural y montañoso de Tucumán para desplegar la conflagración armada y declarar la provincia como zona liberada. La ERP comenzará a operar con relativa intensidad al sudoeste de Tucumán, apresando la trivial localidad de Acheral y dando a conocer al país el nacimiento de la guerrilla campesina.

Hasta ese momento la contienda armada se había escenificado en las ciudades en forma de guerrilla urbana. Con el fin de globalizar la hostilidad, la ERP irá más allá valiéndose de regiones que por sus características geográficas brinden los requisitos precisos para el desempeño de unidades rurales11.

Los combatientes llegan a sojuzgar pequeñas localidades, ultimando a muchas autoridades provinciales. El 11 de agosto fracasa la tentativa de asaltar la unidad militar de Catamarca, un chasco que reduce el activo de los insurgentes. Ante tal encrucijada, María Isabel decreta la movilización del ejército en la zona, y crea, a principios de 1975, el "operativo independencia" desplegando una cruzada militar que ha de durar dos años.

Al igual que sus primos uruguayos Tupamaros, los Montoneros logran levantar una arquitectura de terror con fabriquitas secretas de explosivos y armamentos, de imprentas clandestinas y medios de falsificación. Vaca Narvaja Narvaja, prófugo de la justicia italiana por falsificación de documentos y tenencia de armas, es quien dirige la secretaría de relaciones internacionales de los Montoneros.

La actividad terrorista de todos los grupúsculos rebeldes se sustentaba al contar con fuentes permanentes de recursos financieros que propiciaba un voluminoso y complejo aparato económico, con entidades empresariales que actuaban también como pantalla, y permitían canalizar y manejar ingentes cantidades de recursos.

Los Montoneros alcanzan amasar unos $80 millones procurados por estas empresas capitalistas que secretamente les respondían, y también mediante la extorsión. Las organizaciones subversivas montarán un verdadero espionaje de todo el sistema económico del país, procurando información necesaria a sus fines, ubicando a sus elementos en la estructura administrativa tanto pública como privada, en especial donde es procesada la información económico-social.

En junio de 1975, se celebra en La Habana una reunión de los comunistas de América Latina, donde, con el beneplácito de los soviéticos, Castro pide la unificación y coordinación de todos los partidos para provocar la lucha armada allí donde fuera factible y necesaria. A comienzos de 1976 el rompecabezas bizantino que era la economía Argentina enfrenta tres gravísimos escollos que se interrelacionan: amenaza de hiperinflación con precios relativos fuertemente distorsionados; aguda recesión interna con descensos en la productividad y en la producción; y cesación de pagos externos con un déficit fiscal alarmante donde la inversión registra tasas negativas de variación.

El 24 de marzo se engendra la tragedia al fecundar un golpe de estado castrense que depone a María Isabel. En julio de ese año mueren en un enfrentamiento importantes dirigentes del ERP, entre ellos Santucho. La organización se debilita, sus militantes son cazados en sus escondrijos y comienza el éxodo de sus cuadros. La violenta represión de los sicarios militares se hace sentir en los Montoneros, que acusan una evidente declinación, registrándose numerosas deserciones y delaciones. Con la ayuda de Castro, la cúpula directriz de los Montoneros relocaliza hacia Cuba su estado mayor, su organización laboral y sus cuadros de espionaje, ordenándose a sus militantes el suicidio con pastillas de cianuro en caso de caer en manos de la policía política.

El nuevo refrito oposicionista estructurado en la Coordinadora Revolucionaria, ya muy raquítica dentro de la Argentina, tratará de incrementar su ímpetu en Europa mediante la "concientización" de los organismos defensores de los derechos humanos y la denuncia de la miseria envilecedora que según ellos reinaba en la república de La Plata. También se engendra en Venezuela una agencia noticiosa, la Agencia de Prensa Latina (APAL).

El año 1978 hallará a las organizaciones terroristas de América Latina en regresión. Todas, incluyendo los Montoneros, están totalmente dislocadas y operan con pocas células. Disminuye la eficacia de la acción psicológica y propagandística en el interior del país y languidecen los reclutamientos. La "élite" subversiva ambiciona pilotar las acciones desde el exterior, utilizando vastos fondos financieros y el amparo del gobierno cubano. Numerosos intentos de infiltración armada se maquinan desde La Habana para llevarse a cabo en la Argentina.

A fines de 1979 un limitado grupo montado por Cuba evade la policía Argentina y logra conducir algunas operaciones terroristas que incluyen el asesinato de varios funcionarios. Unidades de Montoneros son incluidas en la brigada internacional que Cuba perfiló para patrocinar la batalla de los sandinistas en Nicaragua. Esta conexión salió a la luz cuando Firmenich, jefe de los Montoneros, en uniforme sandinista y escoltado por su lugarteniente Vaca Narvaja, revela la presencia de una brigada montonera en los sartales de Masaya durante el conflicto contra Somoza. Firmenich admitirá incluso haber contribuido financieramente a la guerra sandinista, sobre todo en sus últimas etapas.

El fiscal argentino Juan Romero Victorica, en entrevista concedida al Diario Popular de Buenos Aires, el 29 de septiembre de 1991, acusa a Cuba de utilizar sus diplomáticos en la Argentina como correos para extraer los dineros obtenidos por los Montoneros de los secuestros efectuados en la década del setenta, señalando de la misma manera la participación de los cubanos en tales operaciones. Romero Victorica indicó que los fondos habían sido despachados por los cubanos vía Perú y México, y partes de los mismos fue lavado a través de los narcotraficantes.

En la actualidad el régimen de Castro retiene unos $100 millones de los Montoneros, donde está incluido el grueso de los $60 millones que los terroristas obtuvieron en los secuestros de los empresarios Juan y Jorge Born en 1975. En palabras del especialista en terrorismo, el rumano Michael Radú12 "lo que hace violentos a los Tupamaros y Montoneros no es su creencia en la justicia social para los pobres, sino su creencia utópica en la necesidad de destruir una sociedad que desconocen con vistas a construir otra que no pueden definir claramente".